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The Puzzle of Deflategate: Private 
Agreements and the Possibility of Biased 
Justice 
Alfred C. Yen1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this Article, I study the implications of National Football League 
Management Council v. National Football League Players Association,2 the recent
decision in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt 
New England Patriots star quarterback Tom Brady a stinging defeat in his so-called 
“Deflategate” case against the National Football League (“NFL”).  I do so because, 
although most of the court’s opinion follows well-established doctrine, a crucial 
portion of decision quickly glosses over important unanswered questions about 
federal arbitration law and the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
that contemplate the appointment of an evidently partial arbitrator.3  This makes the 
implications of the Second Circuit’s decision unclear, and it exposes how the 
Supreme Court’s basic account of federal arbitration law has paid insufficient 
attention to the frequent and overbearing imposition of arbitration on relatively 
unsophisticated parties through contracts of adhesion.  Indeed, I shall argue that 
National Football League Management Council (to which I will give the shorthand 
“NFLMC”) must be understood and interpreted in a limited and careful way to avoid 
 
1 Associate Dean of Faculty and Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  The author would like to 
thank Andrew Smith, Michael Legregni, Kayla Acklin, Erika Steinbauer, and William Howard for their 
research assistance.  Copyright 2016 by Alfred C. Yen. 
2 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
3 A brief explanation of terminology is appropriate.  Although one might expect use of the term “biased” 
in this sentence, I am using the term “evidently partial” because that is the terminology used in a statutory 
provision of importance to this Article, namely §10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act.  9 U.S.C. 
§10(a)(2)(2016).  That section provides that a court may vacate an arbitrator’s award “where there was 
evident partiality” in one of the arbitrators.  Id.  “Biased” and “evidently partial” are clearly similar terms 
in that both describe an arbitrator prone to deciding a case for improper reasons unrelated to the merits.  
However, I am using “evidently partial” so that the relationship between my analysis and the statute 
remains clear.   
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damaging the interests of ordinary consumers and employees in a serious and unfair 
way. 
NFLMC has garnered attention because it featured celebrity combatants whose 
fate would affect the competitive fortunes of perhaps the NFL’s most successful 
franchise.4  The NFL is, of course, America’s favorite sports league,5 with annual 
revenues of approximately $12 billion.6  The League’s Commissioner, Roger 
Goodell, became famous for leading the NFL to record profitability while receiving 
annual compensation of over $34.1 million.7  Their antagonist, Tom Brady, is and 
was probably the NFL’s most prominent player - the quarterback of the then four-
time Super Bowl champion New England Patriots, three-time league Most Valuable 
Player, and husband of a supermodel.8  His four-game suspension damaged the 
Patriot’s chances of winning what would have been a record fifth Super Bowl,9 and 
 
4 See David Leonhardt, The Most Successful N.F.L. Team of the Last Half-Century, N.Y. Times (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/03/upshot/patriots-dynasty-has-a-claim-on-being-the-best.html; 
Jackie MacMullan, Are the Pats the Spurs of the NFL?, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/boston/nfl/story/_/id/12255920/patriots-spurs-nfl; Nate Silver, Are the Patriots Now the 
Greatest NFL Dynasty of All Time?, FiveThirtyEight (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/patriots-nfl-dynasty-greatest-of-all-time/. 
5 See Darren Rovell, NFL most popular for 30th year in a row, ESPN (Jan. 26, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10354114/harris-poll-nfl-most-popular-mlb-2nd (reporting poll results 
indicating that fans strongly consider the NFL their favorite sport). 
6 See Jackie Wattles, NFL sees big jump in revenue, CNN Money (July 20, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/07/20/news/green-bay-packers-revenue/ (estimating NFL revenue at $12 
billion by examining the finances of the Green Bay Packers, the only publicly held NFL franchise); Jason 
Belzer, Thanks to Roger Goodell, NFL Revenues Projected To Surpass $13 Billion in 2016, Forbes (Feb. 
29, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2016/02/29/thanks-to-roger-goodell-nfl-revenues-
projected-to-surpass-13-billion-in-2016/#5df2e4bd3278 (extrapolating projected earnings from player 
revenue sharing amounts). 
7 See Chris Isidore, NFL earns record profits despite ugly image, CNN Money (Jan. 20, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/01/20/news/companies/nfl-profits/ (reporting record profits for NFL in 2014); 
Darren Rovell, Roger Goodell Earned $34.1 Million in 2014 Compensation, ESPN (Feb. 17, 2016),  
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14786414/nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-earned-341-million-
compensation-2014-calendar-year (reporting Goodell’s compensation, which included a bonus of $26.5 
million). 
8 See Judy Batista, Tom Brady relieved after Patriots capture fourth Super Bowl win, NFL.com (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000467668/article/tom-brady-relieved-after-patriots-
capture-fourth-super-bowl-win (referring to Brady having won 4 Super Bowls); Dan Hanzus, Tom Brady 
continues to defy time with performance, NFL.com (Oct. 26, 2015), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000566265/article/tom-brady-continues-to-defy-time-with-
performance (referring to Tom Brady having won 3 Most Valuable Player awards); Charlotte Triggs, 
Gisele Bundchen on Juggling Modeling, Motherhood, and Marriage to Tom: I Try to Experience ‘All the 
Different Aspects of My Life Without Guilt,” People Magazine (April 27, 2016), 
http://www.people.com/article/gisele-bundchen-juggling-motherhood-marriage-to-tom-brady (referring to 
marriage of supermodel Gisele Bundchen and Tom Brady).  Brady and the Patriots have in fact gone on to 
win their fifth Super Bowl.  See Jill Martin, Patriots complete biggest comeback in Super Bowl history, 
win fifth title, CNN (February 6, 2017), http://edition.cnn.com/2017/02/05/sport/super-bowl-li-falcons-
patriots/ (reporting Patriots victory in Super Bowl LI). 
9 See Erin Matuszewski, Brady’s Suspension Makes Patriots More Beatable at Vegas Books, Bloomberg 
News (May 11, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-12/brady-s-suspension-makes-
patriots-more-beatable-at-vegas-books (describing how odds of Patriots winning Super Bowl lengthened 
after suspension imposed); Tom Brady’s DeflateGate Suspension Impacts Patriots’ Super Bowl, AFC East 




it originally cost him over $2 million in salary.10  The public was understandably 
fascinated by the spectacle of the rich and famous spending as much as $20 million 
to argue about the deflation of footballs.11  Many came to see the litigation as the 
struggle of an individual (represented by Brady) against unchecked and overbearing 
institutional power (represented by Goodell and the NFL).12  From that perspective, 
the Second Circuit’s decision in favor of the NFL represented a clear victory for the 
power of the institution over the individual.13 
From a legal perspective, however, NFLMC deserves attention because of the 
way in which the NFL gained its power over Brady and its implications for ordinary 
individuals.  In particular, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) between 
the league and its players union allowed Commissioner Goodell, at his discretion, to 
sit as arbitrator in any appeal by a player over discipline handed down by the 
 
Odds, NESN.com (May 12, 2015), http://nesn.com/2015/05/tom-bradys-deflategate-suspension-impacts-
patriots-super-bow-afc-east-odds/ (same); Benjamin Morris, What if Tom Brady Missed Four Games 
Every Year?, FiveThirtyEight.com (May 12, 2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-if-tom-brady-
missed-four-games-every-year/ (analysis of how Brady’s absence would affect the Patriots if he missed 
four games).  
10 See Gary Dzen, Here’s how much money Tom Brady loses if he’s suspended 4 games, Bost. Globe 
(May 12, 2015), http://www.boston.com/sports/new-england-patriots/2015/05/12/heres-how-much-money-
tom-brady-loses-if-hes-suspended-4-games (reporting Brady would lose about $2 million if suspended for 
4 games during 2015 season). 
11 See Arielle Aronson, Legal costs of Deflategate approach $20 million, Fox Sports (Mar. 2, 2016), 
http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/nfl-tom-brady-new-england-patriots-roger-goodell-deflategate-price-
tag-climbs-030216; John Breech, Deflategate legal costs potentially could reach a staggering $20 million, 
CBS Sports (Mar. 3, 2016), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/deflategate-legal-costs-potentially-could-
reach-a-staggering-20-million/; Darren Rovell, Deflategate Costs Could Be Near $20 Million, ESPN.com 
(Mar. 2, 2016), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/14884145/deflategate-legal-costs-20-million-nfl. 
12 See Michael Schottey, Every NFL Player And Fan Should Be Rooting For Tom Brady’s Deflategate 
Appeal…Yes, You, Forbes (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelschottey/2016/05/25/every-nfl-player-and-fan-should-be-rooting-
for-tom-bradys-deflategate-appeal-yes-you/#6ce348d14337 (characterizing Brady’s case as one 
attempting to put “limits on Goodell’s righteous, almighty power to dole out discipline”); Mike 
Lupica, Deflategate ruling means it’s game over for Roger Goodell’s power trip, New York Daily 
News (September 4, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/lupica-game-roger-goodell-
power-trip-article-1.2348420 (comparing Commissioner Goodell and NFL owners to “fading 
despots”); Mark Patinkin, New Deflategate twists throw Goodell for another loss, Providence Journal 
(February 4, 2016), http://www.providencejournal.com/article/20160204/NEWS/160209628/?Start=1 
(calling NFL investigation and discipline of Brady a witch hunt). 
13 See Christopher Gasper, Deflategate is all about Roger Goodell’s power, not Brady’s punishment, Bos. 
Globe (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/patriots/2016/04/26/deflategate-all-about-
goodell-power-not-brady-punishment/HSvWSEfGp88C1qdq1UYKmI/story.html (NFL’s victory before 
Second Circuit confirms league’s “plenipotentiary powers” over players); Dieter Kurtenbach, Why 
Deflategate was about money and control, not air pressure, Fox Sports (July 15, 2016), 
http://www.foxsports.com/nfl/story/tom-brady-deflategate-patriots-quarterback-goodell-new-england-psi-
pressure-suspension-071516 (Deflategate outcome confirms that Goodell can do “whatever he pleases” to 
Tom Brady and others associated with the NFL); Brian Smith, Tom Brady ruling reaffirms NFL’s power 
over players, Hous. Chron. (Apr. 25, 2016), 
http://www.houstonchronicle.com/sports/columnists/smith/article/Tom-Brady-ruling-reaffirms-NFL-s-
power-over-7350676.php (referring to Goodell as “King Roger” who “overpowered” Patriots owner 
Robert Kraft and Tom Brady). 




league.14  Thus, when Brady appealed his four-game suspension, Goodell himself 
heard the appeal and predictably ruled against Brady.15  Brady objected to this, 
attacking Goodell as an evidently partial and biased arbitrator who could not 
properly hear a case involving the actions of his own office.16  Unfortunately for 
Brady, the Second Circuit disagreed and ruled that Goodell, however partial he 
might be, could serve as arbitrator because Brady had agreed to it under the CBA.17 
Ample precedent supported this result. The Supreme Court has clearly stated 
that federal law makes agreements to arbitrate legal disputes generally enforceable 
“according to their terms.”18  Because the arbitration law emphasizes contract,19 
parties to arbitration agreements have considerable discretion to agree to almost 
anything.20  Granted, parties cannot agree to things that the law prohibits,21 but 
recent Supreme Court precedent strongly suggests that these prohibitions are 
exceedingly few, even when one of the parties does not know or understand what 
has been ostensibly agreed to.22   This implies that parties generally have the 
freedom to permit appointment of an evidently partial arbitrator.23  
Good reasons exist, however, for our legal system to reject the appointment of 
an evidently partial arbitrator.24  Modern courts give parties the freedom to contract 
into arbitration because the Supreme Court considers arbitration a fair substitute for 
litigation.25  It is therefore fundamentally fair to hold parties to the terms of 
arbitration agreements, even when one party did not genuinely consent, because the 
party forced into arbitration loses nothing of significant value.26 
This reasoning is reasonably persuasive as long as the differences between 
arbitration and litigation do not include the crucial features that that guarantee the 
 
14 See NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Article 46(2)(a), available at 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/General/2011_Final_CBA_Searchable_Book
marked.pdf (giving Commissioner discretion to sit as hearing officer for any appeal concerning league 
discipline imposed on a player). 
15 See infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra note 78 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 108–110 and accompanying text. 
18 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013) (courts must enforce 
arbitration agreements “according to their terms”); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 
(2012) (Federal Arbitration Act “requires courts to enforce agreements to arbitrate according to their 
terms”); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (Federal Arbitration Act makes 
arbitration agreements enforceable “as written”). See also infra notes 178-181 and accompanying text. 
19 See Am. Express Co. 133 S. Ct. at 2309 (overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract); 
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (referring to “fundamental principle that 
arbitration is a matter of contract”). 
20 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
21 Id. 
22 See infra Part III. 
23 Id. 
24 See infra note 183 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra Part III. 
26 Id. 




fundamental fairness of litigation itself.  For example, our legal system constantly 
changes the causes of action and remedies available in litigation, and rules of 
procedure vary.27  This implies that arbitration rules about procedures, substantive 
rights and remedies could differ from those found in litigation without 
compromising the fairness of arbitration in a fundamental way. 
By contrast, one thing that never changes in litigation is the impartiality of the 
judge.  Obviously, a biased judge destroys the integrity of litigation because judges 
are supposed to decide cases on the merits, and not because of self-interest or 
personal connections to one of the parties.28  The crucial role played by the impartial 
judge implies that arbitration can be a fair substitute for litigation only when the 
arbitrator is impartial.29  Biased arbitrators would destroy the fairness of arbitration 
just as biased judges destroy the fairness of litigation.30  This explains why some 
courts have refused to enforce arbitration contracts that allow one party to ensure 
appointment of an evidently partial arbitrator.31  These decisions obviously suggest 
that, despite the primacy of freedom of contract in arbitration law, parties cannot 
agree to appoint evidently partial arbitrators.32  
The foregoing shows that NFLMC presents a legal puzzle.  On one hand, the 
decision could be a completely routine and uncontroversial example of a court 
enforcing pretty much anything found in an arbitration agreement.  From this 
perspective, the agreement to appoint an evidently partial arbitrator is simply one of 
many things that parties bargain and compromise over in order to reach a mutually 
beneficial arrangement.  Agreement between the parties presumptively ensures 
fairness even if the arrangements seem to favor one side over the other.  On the 
other hand, the decision could be a highly problematic extension of the law that 
overlooks the critical importance of impartiality to arbitration as a fair alternative to 
litigation.  Under this view, arbitration before an evidently partial arbitrator can 
never be an acceptable substitute for litigation, making NFLMC a highly 
questionable decision. 
Resolving the tension behind this puzzle has potentially far reaching 
consequences.  Enforcing arbitration agreements makes sense when the parties 
genuinely agree about unusual or one-sided provisions.  After all, people frequently 
trade disadvantages in one part of a contract for advantages in other parts.33  The 
 
27 See infra notes 201–04 and accompanying text. 
28 Id. 
29 See infra Part IVA. 
30 See infra notes 203–225 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra at notes 209–226 and accompanying text.  
32 See infra note 225 and accompanying text. 
33 See AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S at 344 (2011) (“The point of affording parties discretion in designing 
arbitration processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”); 




Supreme Court has, however, significantly disregarded genuine contractual 
agreement as a condition for enforcing pre-dispute arbitration agreements.34  
Instead, the Court has enforced numerous agreements to arbitrate based only on the 
ostensible but fictional agreement of adhesion contracts.35  This has sent a clear 
signal that, as far as the federal law of arbitration is concerned, courts should lump 
adhesion contracts with other contracts, enforcing both without regard to whether 
the parties have genuinely agreed to the terms.36 
This conflation of ordinary and adhesion contracts makes NFLMC a potentially 
powerful and troubling case.  Enforcing an agreement between the NFL and NFLPA 
to appoint an evidently partial arbitrator makes reasonable sense because both 
parties bargained over the CBA at arms length and surely had counsel to advise 
them of the consequences of their agreement.37  Indeed, the two parties had 
previously litigated the enforceability of a similar arbitration provision, and the 
Eighth Circuit ruled in the league’s favor.38  Accordingly, it is certain that both 
parties knew exactly what they were doing when they signed the agreement under 
litigation in NFLMC. 
If we accept the conflation of adhesion and ordinary arbitration contracts, courts 
must enforce adhesion contracts just as they would ordinary contracts like the CBA.  
Accordingly, if the NFL and NFLPA can agree to appoint an evidently partial 
arbitrator, a business can also use a contract of adhesion to maneuver a consumer or 
employee into arbitration before a partial, biased arbitrator.  For example, a credit 
card company could require its customers to arbitrate all wrongful charge claims 
before the company’s collection agent.  This would, of course, make if very difficult 
 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (parties trade formalities and opportunity 
for review in litigation for simplicity, informality, and speed of arbitration). 
34 See infra notes 127–181 and accompanying text.  
35 Id. 
36 See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 476 (2015) (Enforcing arbitration clause in consumers 
contract with satellite television provider); AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 339 (2011) (Arbitration 
agreement upheld against consumers whom signed up for free cell phone service); Carnival Cruise Lines, 
Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585 (1991) (Consumer agreement to forum selection clause as part of ticket 
purchase was enforceable); See also Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The 
Shrink-Wrap Agreement As an Adhesion Contract, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 319, 320–21 (1999) (Discussing 
adhesion contracts and the consumers inability to negotiate the terms despite their enforceability); Todd D. 
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1189 (1983) 
(Contracts of adhesion terms should be considered unenforceable but currently are presumed enforceable). 
37 Maury Brown, NFLPA Memo Details Chronology of CBA Negotiations Over Past Four Years, Forbes 
(May 18, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sportsmoney/2011/05/18/nflpa-memo-details-chronology-of-
cba-negotiations-over-past-four-years/#17ab706d2bac (describing detailed and involved negotiations over 
the CBA); Nate Davis, NFL, players announce new 10-year labor agreement, USA Today (July 25, 2011), 
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2011/07/reports-nfl-players-agree-to-new-
collective-bargaining-agreement/1#.V2le9OYrL-Y (noting extensive negotiations over CBA). 
38 Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 884–85 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming arbitration held 
before the NFL’s general counsel pursuant to agreement with NFLPA contained within the NFL’s drug 
testing policy). 




for ordinary individuals to vindicate claims through arbitration, and it is troubling 
because individuals generally have no idea that they have “agreed” to binding 
arbitration buried in the fine print of service and employment contracts.39 
In the pages that follow, I will explore how strongly federal arbitration law, 
particularly the Supreme Court’s conflation of adhesion with ordinary contracts, 
supports these potentially troubling implications of NFLMC.  I conclude that 
NFLMC was correctly decided, but that a nuanced understanding of Supreme Court 
precedent actually gives NFLMC influence over a relatively narrow set of future 
cases, thereby limiting its potentially troubling implications.  I support this 
conclusion by showing that the Supreme Court’s rationale for conflating adhesion 
contracts with ordinary contracts does not support the consistent enforcement of all 
agreements that contemplate evidently partial arbitrators.  Instead, despite outward 
appearances to the contrary, federal arbitration law accepts the appointment of 
evidently partial arbitrators only when the parties genuinely understand and agree to 
that arrangement.  This rules out the use of adhesion contracts to maneuver ordinary 
individuals into arbitration before improperly biased arbitrators. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes NFLMC and its potential 
implications.  Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s implementation of freedom of 
contract, particularly through the Federal Arbitration Act, to enforce pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements without regard to the use of adhesion contracts, even if the 
result is potentially unfair.  Part III then explores the implications of NFLMC by 
taking a look at Supreme Court jurisprudence in arbitration law, the rationale 
supporting that jurisprudence, and its application by lower courts.  This requires 
examination of the law governing selection of arbitrators and its relationship to 
freedom of contract in arbitration. Part IV takes the insights gained in Part III and 
applies them to show NFLMC should be followed only in cases involving genuine 
agreement over appointment of evidently partial arbitrators, and that contracts of 
adhesion should not be permitted to procure arbitration before evidently partial 
arbitrators.  The Article concludes with some thoughts about the future of arbitration 
law in light of NFLMC. 
 
 
39 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1745, 
1753 (2014) (“The proposition that consumers do not read contracts of adhesion is increasingly 
uncontroversial.”); See Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts, Preemption, and the Structure of 
Copyright Policymaking, 41 U. Cal. Davis L. Rev. 45, 55 (2007) (“Much of the literature on adhesion 
contracts posits that very few people read, much less understand, form contracts; this view is certainly 
supported by common sense.”). 
 




II. THE BASICS OF NFLMC AND ITS POTENTIAL SIGNIFICANCE 
A. The Facts 
 
Appreciation for the legal aspects of NFLMC requires a brief exposition of the 
case, which arose from acts allegedly taken by Tom Brady and members of the New 
England Patriots staff before the 2015 AFC Championship game between the 
Patriots and the Indianapolis Colts.40  Sometime before the 2015 AFC 
Championship game, members of the Colts’ management became concerned that 
the Patriots would deliberately under-inflate footballs supplied by the Patriots for 
use in the game.41  Because an NFL offense uses only the footballs provided by its 
team, under-inflated balls would give the Patriots a theoretical unfair advantage 
because the softer balls would be easier to grip.42 
NFL policy required the game officials to check each ball for proper inflation 
between 12.5 and 13.5 pounds per square inch, and this was done before the game.43  
Nevertheless, when Colts linebacker D’Qwell Jackson intercepted a Patriots’ pass 
during the first half, he gave the ball to a Colts’ equipment manager who tested the 
ball and found it under-inflated.44  Colts management learned of this and alerted the 
NFL.45  This led to re-testing of the balls during halftime, and balls provided by the 
 
40 See Tom Brady carries Pats to rout of Colts, claims sixth Super Bowl trip, ESPN.com (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/recap?gameId=400749520 (recap of 2015 AFC Championship Game between New 
England Patriots and Indianapolis Colts). 
41 See Will Brinson, Ravens warned Cols about Patriots tampering with footballs, CBS Sports (Aug. 4, 
2015), http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/ravens-warned-colts-about-patriots-tampering-with-footballs/; 
Dan Good and Aaron Katersky, Deflate-gate: Indianapolis Colts Raised Concerns in November About 
Under-Inflated New England Patriots Balls, ABC News (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/deflate-gate-indianapolis-colts-complained-november-inflated-
england/story?id=28365105; Theodore V. Wells Jr. et al., Investigative Report Concerning Footballs Used 
During the AFC Championship Game on January 18, 2015 44 (May 6, 2015), available at 
http://static.nfl.com/static/content/public/photo/2015/05/06/0ap3000000491381.pdf (reporting that Colts 
General Manager sent email to NFL raising concerns about inflation of Patriots game balls).  
42 See Ryan Van Bibber, Everything you need to know about the Patriots and DeflateGate, SBNation (Jan. 
21, 2015), http://www.sbnation.com/nfl/2015/1/21/7856953/deflategate-new-england-patriots-footballs-
nfl-investigation (under-inflated balls are easier to grip and each offense uses the balls provided by its 
team); Ben Volin, Former NFL referee explains protocol with game balls, Bos. Globe (Jan. 24, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/01/24/expert-explains-protocol-with-nfl-game-
balls/fCtQ38pBjBFXId0WJC2wpL/story.html (explaining why offenses are allowed to use balls provided 
by their teams); Dion Rabouin, Deflategate: Former Patriots Quarterback Explains Benefits of Under-
Inflated Football, Int’l Bus. Times (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/deflategate-former-patriots-
quarterback-explains-benefits-under-inflated-football-1792910 (softer footballs are easier to grip, 
especially in cold or damp conditions). 
43 See Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 
454 (S.D.N.Y 2015). 
44 See Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, Theodore Wells, Jr., Brad Karp, and Lorin Reisner, 
Investigative Report Concerning Footballs Used During the AFC Championship Game on January 18, 
2015 (May 6, 2015) at 63 [hereinafter “Wells Report”]. 
45 Id. 




Patriots did appear to be under-inflated.46  The referees re-inflated the balls in 
question and the game continued, with the Patriots pulling away for a lopsided 
win.47 
After the game, social media and news outlets began circulating rumors about 
the Patriots having tampered with footballs,48 and the NFL eventually opened an 
investigation led by Theodore V. Wells Jr.49  This investigation lasted ten months 
and concluded that Tom Brady was “at least generally aware” of a scheme to deflate 
footballs carried out by Patriots staff members.50  Three major areas of investigation 
supported this conclusion. 
First, the investigation concluded that balls provided by the Patriots were indeed 
underinflated at halftime, although they had been properly inflated before the game 
started.51  Obviously, deliberate tampering by the Patriots would be one explanation 
for these low pressure readings, but innocent causes were also possible.  The game 
was played in cold weather,52 and the referee measured the balls for proper inflation 
before the game in a warm locker room.53  Accordingly, exposure to the cold could 
have caused the air in the balls to contract, leading to lower measured inflation.54  
 
46 Wells Report, supra note, at 64–69. 
47 Id. at 69–71; See Gregg Rosenthal, Patriots dominate Colts, to meet ‘Hawks in Super Bowl, NFL.com 
(Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000460542/article/patriots-dominate-colts-to-
meet-hawks-in-super-bowl (reporting final score of the 2015-16 AFC Championship game as 54-7 in favor 
of the Patriots). 
48 See Jenny Earl, Twitter trolls New England Patriots with #DeflateGate tweets, CBS News (Jan. 21, 
2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/twitter-trolls-deflatriots-with-deflategate-tweets/ (reporting social 
media activity about the alleged deflation of balls by the Patriots); Jason Molinet, Colts player tweets 
Patriots 'could've played with soap for balls and beat us' - Pats blitzed on Twitter as NFL report accuses 
them of underinflating footballs, N.Y.  Daily News (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/patriots-attacked-social-media-underinflated-balls-article-
1.2086279 (reporting about social media and alleged deflation of footballs by Patriots); Steve Silva, Harsh 
Reaction to Patriots #Deflategate News on Social Media, Bos. Globe (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.boston.com/sports/extra-
points/2015/01/21/harsh_reaction_to_patriots_deflategate_news_on_soc (same). 
49 Wells Report, supra note 44, at 1. 
50 Id. at 2 (“it is more probable than not that Tom Brady (the quarterback for the Patriots) was at least 
generally aware” of deliberate attempts to deflate footballs by Patriots staff). 
51 Id. 68, 111–12. 
52 The game temperature was about 48 degrees Fahrenheit.  See Wells Report at 113;  East Foxboro MA 
Hourly Weather Data for January 18, 2015, The Friendly Forecast (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.friendlyforecast.com/usa/archive/archive.php?region=MA&id=156489&date=2015011800000
0&sort=hour (reporting temperature in the general area near the game on January 18, 2015 as in the high 
40s and low 50s during the late afternoon and evening). 
53 The locker room temperature was determined to be about room temperature between 67 and 74 degrees 
before the game and during halftime.  See Wells Report, supra note 44, at 113. 
54 The ideal gas law is PV=nRT, which means the product of pressure and volume is proportional to the 
amount of particles multiplied by the temperature, so when the temperature changes, the pressure changes. 
See John D. Cutnell et. al., Physics, Volume One 370 (Jessica Fiorillo et. al. eds., 10th ed. 2015); Kristian 
Dyer, Sports Physicist says Temperature could have caused football deflation, Yahoo Sports (Jan. 26, 
2015), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-shutdown-corner/sports-physicist-says-temperature-could-have-
caused-football-deflation-234639741.html (discussing possibility that weather alone caused apparent 
deflation of footballs in 2015 AFC Championship game); James Glanz, Deflation Experiments Show 




The investigative report discounted this possibility for two reasons.  As an initial 
matter, balls provided by the Colts did not measure as significantly underinflated.55  
Additionally, the decrease in measured pressure in the Patriots’ balls was, according 
to a consultant hired by the NFL, larger than any decrease that exposure to game 
temperatures would have caused.56 
Second, the investigation collected oral statements and text messages involving 
two Patriots staff members.57  These suggested that the two of them, officials’ 
locker room attendant James McNally and equipment manager Dave Jastremski, 
worked together to deflate footballs to Brady’s satisfaction during the 2014-15 
season.58  This evidence included texts in which McNally referred to himself as the 
“deflator” and apparently complained that Brady was too fussy about football 
inflation.59  In other texts, Jastremski appeared to assure McNally that he would 
receive balls and shoes autographed by Brady.60   
Third, video footage taken by a security camera on the day of the AFC 
championship game showed McNally taking a bag of footballs into a bathroom for a 
brief moment before continuing on to the field.61  This suggested to the investigators 
that McNally had taken the balls from the referees’ locker room into the bathroom 
to be deflated.62  
Troy Vincent, the NFL’s Executive Vice President for Football Operations, 
communicated the league’s discipline to Brady.63  Vincent concluded that there was 
“substantial and credible evidence” to conclude that Brady at least knew of a 
scheme to deflate footballs.64  Additionally, Vincent stated that Brady had not fully 
cooperated with the investigation.65  Because the league considered Brady’s 
 
Patriots May Have a Point After All, N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/30/sports/football/deflation-experiments-show-patriots-may-
have-science-on-their-side-after-all.html?_r=0 (discussing application of ideal gas law and calculations 
supporting conclusion that Patriots did not tamper with footballs); Kristian Dyer, Sports Physicist says 
Temperature could have caused football deflation, Yahoo Sports (January 26, 2015), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-shutdown-corner/sports-physicist-says-temperature-could-have-caused-
football-deflation-234639741.html (discussing possibility that weather alone caused apparent deflation of 
footballs in 2015 AFC Championship game).  
55 Wells Report, supra note 44, at 69. 
56 Id. at 111 (asserting that lower temperatures alone cannot explain drop in pressure for Patriots’ 
footballs). 
57 See id. at 101–110 (recounting statements and text messages made by certain Patriots staff). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 75–78. 
60 Id. at 87–94. 
61 Id. at 57–58. 
62 Id. at 124. 
63 See Troy Vincent’s Letter to Tom Brady, (May 12, 2015), available at 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/12873455/troy-vincent-letter-tom-brady.   
64 Id. 
65 Id. 




behavior “conduct detrimental to the integrity and public confidence in the game of 
professional football,” Vincent suspended Brady for four games.66   
 
Reaction from Brady, the Patriots, and their supporters was predictably swift 
and vehement.  Brady of course maintained his innocence, stating his intention to 
appeal.67  This meant going before an arbitrator of the NFL’s choosing, and 
Commissioner Goodell appointed himself as the arbitrator.68  This did not sit well 
with the NFLPA and Brady for obvious reasons.  Goodell’s position as 
Commissioner practically guaranteed that he would look favorably on the league’s 
action, as he had a personal stake in ensuring that the league could discipline players 
as it saw fit.  Accordingly, Brady asked Goodell to recuse himself from the case, but 
Goodell refused.69 
Not surprisingly, Goodell affirmed the NFL’s discipline of Brady.70  The 
Commissioner held a hearing that lasted about ten hours and affirmed the four-game 
suspension.71  Moreover, Goodell found that Brady had obstructed the NFL’s 
investigation.72  He found that Brady had engaged in conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of football and that the penalty imposed by the league was reasonable, 
especially when compared with other serious offenses like the use of performance 
enhancing drugs.73   
 
B.   NFLMC at the District Court 
 
Goodell’s decision set the stage for the NFLMC litigation.  Anticipating that 
Brady would resort to litigation, the NFL filed suit in New York to confirm the 
 
66 Troy Vincent’s Letter to Tom Brady, (May 12, 2015), available at 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/12873455/troy-vincent-letter-tom-brady.   
67 See Jack Andrade, Tom Brady’s agent: NFL’s punishment ‘has no legitimate basis’, Boston.com (May 
11, 2015), http://www.boston.com/sports/new-england-patriots/2015/05/11/tom-bradys-agent-nfls-
punishment-has-no-legitimate-basis (reporting statement of Brady’s agent contending that “no evidence” 
supported Brady’s involvement in scheme to deflate footballs); Mark Maske, Tom Brady Suspended Four 
Games, Patriots fined $1 million and docked two draft choices as ‘DeflateGate’ punishment, Wash. Post 
(May 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/2015/05/11/tom-brady-suspended-four-
games-patriots-fined-1-million-and-docked-two-draft-choices-as-deflategate-punishment/ (reporting 
Brady’s intention to appeal). 
68 See 2011 Nat’l Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 46, §2(a) (Aug. 4. 2011), 
archived at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0UcXeAWR7o8 (giving Commissioner the power to appoint 
hearing officers for appeals of discipline, but also providing that “the Commissioner may serve as hearing 
officer in any appeal under Section 1(a) of this Article at his discretion.”). 
69 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 820 F.3d  534, 534–35 
(2d Cir. 2016). 








arbitration award.74  Soon thereafter, Brady and the NFLPA sued in Minnesota to 
have the award vacated, but the NFL successfully moved to have both actions 
consolidated in the Southern District of New York before Judge Richard Berman.75  
Brady made three general arguments to support his claim that Goodell’s 
decision should be overturned.  First, he contended that Goodell had exceeded his 
arbitral authority under the CBA by failing to give Brady notice about potential 
discipline for his alleged behavior.76  Second, he asserted that Goodell’s procedural 
rulings rendered the arbitration fundamentally unfair.77  Third, he maintained that 
Goodell was “evidently partial” within the meaning of section 10(a)(2) of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.78  Judge Berman agreed with Brady’s first two arguments 
and vacated Brady’s suspension.79  Berman chose not to rule on Goodell’s alleged 
partiality because a finding on the issue would not affect the outcome of the case.80 
With respect to Goodell’s authority under the CBA, Judge Berman recognized 
that courts give arbitrators considerable latitude in interpreting arbitration 
agreements.81  Nevertheless, Judge Berman found limits to that deference, refusing 
to confirm an award that he considered unfair or lacking in due process.82  This led 
him to scrutinize the process by which the NFL disciplined Brady and interpret the 
CBA in a manner that led to overturning Goodell’s decision.  In particular, Berman 
focused on the NFL’s failure to notify Brady specifically that he could be suspended 
for tampering with footballs or not cooperating with the NFL’s investigation.83  The 
NFL argued that the CBA gave the league authority to impose this discipline under 
Article 46(a), which contemplates discipline for “conduct detrimental to the 
integrity of, or public confidence in, the game of professional football.”84  Berman 
disagreed.  Although the CBA did not contain any provisions specifically requiring 
notice to Brady, the court held that the CBA incorporated earlier arbitral rulings and 
 
74 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 535. 
75 Id. 
76 Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate Arbitration Award, at 2–9, Nat’l Football League Mgt. Council 
v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass'n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 15-5916), (Aug. 7, 
2015). 
77 Id. at 14–15. 
78 9 U.S.C. §10(a)(2)(2002) (providing for vacatur when arbitrator is “evident[ly] partial”); See Mem. of 
Law in Supp. of Mot. to Vacate Arbitration Award, at 14, Nat’l Football League Mgt. Council v. Nat’l 
Football League Players Ass'n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (No. 15-5916), (Aug. 7, 2015). 
79 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass'n, 125 F. Supp. 3d 449, 
463–73 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).  
80 Id. at 473–74. 
81 Id. at 463 (“The Court is fully aware of the deference afforded to arbitral decisions, but, nevertheless, 
concludes that the Award should be vacated.”). 
82 Id. at 462–63. 
83 Id. at 463–69. 
84 Id. at 469; 2011 Nat’l Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 46, §1(a) (Aug 4. 2011), 
archived at http://perma.law.harvard.edu/0UcXeAWR7o8. 




cases that made notice a prerequisite to discipline.85  Accordingly, the NFL’s failure 
to give specific notice violated the CBA and rendered the discipline of Brady 
invalid.86 
The court applied a similar level of scrutiny to Goodell’s procedural rulings 
during the arbitration.  Here, however, the court did not find limits to Goodell’s 
authority in the CBA.  Instead, Judge Berman relied on minimum standards of 
fairness expected in all arbitrations under the Federal Arbitration Act.87  This led 
Judge Berman to conclude that Goodell made two important procedural errors.  
First, he denied Brady access to files generated by the investigation.88  Second, he 
refused to hear testimony from NFL General Counsel Jeff Pash.89  The NFL 
considered both of these decisions to be well within the arbitrator’s discretion, for 
the law does not require arbitration to offer participants the same level of discovery 
or access to witnesses found in litigation.90  Nevertheless, Judge Berman thought 
that Brady suffered enough prejudice from Goodell’s rulings to render the entire 
proceeding “fundamentally unfair.”91 
 
C.   NFLMC at the Second Circuit 
 
Judge Berman’s decision to reinstate Brady caused an enormous uproar.92  Not 
surprisingly, the league promptly appealed to the Second Circuit.  That court 
reversed Judge Berman in a 2-1 decision.93 
In an opinion written by Judge Parker, the Second Circuit made clear that the 
District Court had given Commissioner Goodell the insufficient deference.94  
According to the court, Goodell’s award was valid as long as he was arguably 
within the authority granted by the arbitration agreement.  Judge Parker wrote, 
 
85 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 125 F. Supp. 3d at 469–70.  
86 Id. at 470. 
87 See id. at 471. 
88 Id. at 472–73. 
89 Id. at 471. 
90 Id. at 471–472. 
91 Id. at 473.  
92 See Patriots and NFL Players React Tom Brady Suspension Ruling, N.Y. Times (Sept. 3, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/sports/football/patriots-and-nfl-players-react-to-tom-brady-
suspension-ruling.html?_r=0; Jason Gay, Deflategate, Brady, Turtle, Rabbit, Juice Box, Wall St. J. (Sept. 
3, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/deflategate-brady-turtle-rabbit-juice-box-1441323447; See also 
Doug Most, Ortiz, Trump, and more react to ruling, Bost. Globe (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/sports/2015/09/03/reaction-judge-ruling-nullifying-tom-brady-nfl-
suspension-pours/q4QNlkTYvn73LfNn2yVAnO/story.html (reporting various reactions on social media to 
Judge Berman’s ruling).  
93 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass'n, 820 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 
2016). 
94 Id. at 532, 536–37 (review of arbitrator is “very limited”). 




“[O]ur task is simply to ensure that the arbitrator was ‘even arguably construing or 
applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority’ and did not 
‘ignore the plain language of the contract.’  Even failure to ‘follow arbitral 
precedent’ is no reason to vacate an award.’”95  This meant that the NFL was correct 
in arguing that the league did not have to give Tom Brady notice before imposing 
discipline for tampering with footballs and failing to cooperate with the league’s 
investigation.96  Remember, the CBA contained a provision contemplating 
discipline for “conduct detrimental” to football.97  Although parties might 
reasonably differ on whether this provision obviated notice to Brady, all that 
mattered was Goodell being arguably correct in his determination that he did not 
have to give notice.98  The Second Circuit believed he was and therefore reversed 
the District Court on this issue.99 
The Second Circuit gave Goodell similar deference on the issues of access to 
files and testimony from Mr. Pash, but constructed that deference in a slightly 
different way.  As noted above, interpretation of the CBA controlled whether Brady 
was entitled to notice.  As long as Goodell was arguably within the boundaries of 
the CBA, his decision would stand.100  By contrast, the CBA did not – at least 
initially – resolve whether Brady was entitled to get access to files and testimony 
from Pash. Instead, the limits on Goodell’s authority turned on basic standards of 
fairness embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act. 101  The court noted that the FAA 
permitted vacatur only if “fundamental fairness” is violated.102  Judge Parker then 
used the CBA to help determine what would be fundamentally fair between the 
parties.103 
With respect to Pash’s testimony, the court noted that the CBA did not require 
the NFL’s investigation to be independent, and this made Pash’s testimony about 
editing the report less relevant to the Commissioner’s determination.104  Similarly, 
the court pointed out that the CBA required only the exchange of documents relied 
on by parties at the hearing before the Commissioner, and the NFL did not rely on 
the investigative files at the hearing.105  These observations led Parker to conclude 
 
95 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 537 (citations omitted) (quoting United Paperworkers 
Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987)). 
96 Id. at 538–45. 
97 Id. at 537–38, 544–45. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 537. 
101 Id. at 545 (noting “narrow exception” under the Federal Arbitration Act that permits vacation of 
arbitration award if arbitrator is “guilty of misconduct” in failing to consider certain evidence).  
102 Id. at 546 (Commissioner’s ruling vulnerable only if it violated “fundamental fairness”). 
103 Id. at 545–46 (analyzing whether Commissioner’s behavior was consistent with broad authority granted 
by the CBA). 
104 Id. at 546. 
105 Id. at 546–47.  




that it was not fundamentally unfair for Goodell to refuse hearing Pash’s testimony 
and deny Brady access to investigative files not relied upon at the arbitration 
hearing.106 
The Second Circuit could have reversed and remanded to the District Court 
solely on its rulings about notice, access to files, and testimony from Mr. Pash.  
However, the court apparently wanted to end the proceedings definitively and 
reached to rule on the claims that the District Court had not yet decided, resolving 
all of them in favor of the NFL.107  For purposes of the Article, the most important 
of these concerned Brady’s claim that the court should vacate Goodell’s ruling 
because he exhibited “evident partiality” under Federal Arbitration Act §10(a)(2).108   
The Second Circuit summarily rejected this argument as a matter of basic 
contract law.  The union had agreed to the CBA, binding Brady to its provisions.  
Accordingly, Brady could expect whatever level of fairness the contract 
embodied.109  Unfortunately for Brady, this included the possibility of Goodell 
sitting as arbitrator.  The Court wrote:  
[A]rbitration is a matter of contract, and consequently, the 
parties to an arbitration can ask for no more impartiality than 
inheres in the method they have chosen. … Here, the parties 
contracted in the CBA to specifically allow the Commissioner to 
sit as the arbitrator in all disputes brought pursuant to Article 46, 
Section 1(a). They did so knowing full well that the 
Commissioner had the sole power of determining what 
constitutes “conduct detrimental,” and thus knowing that the 
Commissioner would have a stake both in the underlying 
discipline and in every arbitration brought pursuant to Section 
1(a). Had the parties wished to restrict the Commissioner’s 
authority, they could have fashioned a different agreement.110 
 
D.   The Potential Significance of NFLMC 
 
The routine treatment given to Commissioner Goodell’s evident partiality hides 
challenges implicit in the holding of NFLMC and some potentially troubling 
implications.  Goodell clearly met the definition of an evidently partial arbitrator.  
 
106 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 546–47. 
107 Id. at 547–48. 
108 Id. at 548; Section 10(a)(2) of the Federal Arbitration Act permits vacating of arbitration awards ‘where 
there was evident partiality’ on the part of an arbitrator. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2016). 
109 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 548.   
110 Id. 




Although the Supreme Court has not provided an authoritative definition of “evident 
partiality,” courts of appeal generally find that evident partiality exists when facts 
establish a reasonable impression of partiality.111  Because Goodell was the NFL 
Commissioner, he managed the entity whose interests were directly adverse to 
Brady’s.  Indeed, he had appointed himself to review the fairness of decisions made 
by his own staff.112  Given these facts, a reasonable person would surely conclude 
that Goodell was predisposed to side with the NFL against Brady.   
Nevertheless, Brady lost because the CBA required the court to ignore the 
possibility of evident partiality.113  After all, the CBA was a valid contract, and 
acceptance of that validity implied holding Brady to its terms.114  Acceptance of this 
reasoning could greatly influence the future of arbitration law by encouraging the 
adoption and enforcement of arbitration agreements that bind NFL stars and 
ordinary individuals alike to arbitration before evidently partial arbitrators.  The 
NFL and NFLPA agreed to the CBA after a long and detailed process of 
negotiation, making actual agreement to its terms fairly likely.115  However, many 
arbitration agreements get made without negotiation over the relevant terms and 
consequences.  Most notably, modern businesses frequently use contracts of 
adhesion to maneuver individuals (often ordinary consumers or employees) into 
arbitration and other potentially undesirable situations.116  These customers give 
assent by “clicking through” pages of text on the Internet or signing documents they 
do not read or fully understand.  Although arguments for the invalidity of these 
contracts exist, courts routinely enforce them.117  If, as NFLMC suggests, it really is 
 
111 See New Regency Prod., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, 501 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007) (legal 
standard for evident partiality satisfied by facts showing a reasonable impression of partiality); Apperson 
v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1358 (6th Cir. 1989) (to satisfy evident partiality test, party 
challenging award must show that a reasonable person would conclude arbitrator was biased); Morelite 
Constr. Co. v. N.Y.C. Dist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984) (“evident 
partiality” exists “where a reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial.”).  
112 Letter from Roger Goodell to NFLPA regarding Brady appeal, NFL.com (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000495253/article/letter-from-roger-goodell-to-nflpa-regarding-
brady-appeal (setting forth Goodell’s refusal to recuse himself as arbitrator and stating that discipline 
imposed on Brady was done under the Commissioner’s authority). 
113 Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council, 820 F.3d at 548.   
114 Id. 
115 See Brown, supra note 37 (describing detailed and involved negotiations over the CBA); see also 
Davis, supra note 37 (noting extensive negotiations over CBA).   
116 See The Problem, Citizen Works, 2014, http://www.faircontracts.org/problem (listing various types of 
clauses placed in consumer adhesion contracts).  
117 See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (arbitration agreement that was part of satellite 
television contract enforced); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012) (enforcing 
mandatory arbitration contained in credit card agreement); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333 (2011) (enforcing waiver of class relief found in arbitration agreement that was part of contract for 
cellular phone service). See also 2 E-Com. and Int. L. 21.03[2] (2015 update) (click through and browse-
wrap agreements upheld by federal and state courts); Cheryl B. Preston, “Please Note: You Have Waived 
Everything”: Can Notice Redeem Online Contracts?, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 535, 540–52 (2015) (describing 
routine enforcement of adhesion contracts, including click-through and browse-wrap contracts). 




the norm to enforce agreements to appoint evidently partial arbitrators, then 
businesses apparently have the power to force ordinary individuals into highly 
unfavorable systems of dispute resolution.  For example, a credit card company 
could draft customer contracts that require consumers to arbitrate any dispute with 
the company before the company’s debt collection manager.  Consumers forced to 
arbitrate under such terms would almost certainly lose, even if they had valid 
claims.   
The foregoing raises the question of whether the Second Circuit reached the 
correct result in NFLMC and, if so, how broadly courts should understand and apply 
the decision.  Answering this question requires exploration of the role that freedom 
of contract plays in arbitration law and the premises on which that role is based.  
This involves exploration of three related facets of arbitration law – the primacy of 
freedom of contract, the relationship between unbiased arbitrators and fair 
arbitration, and waivers of complaints about evidently partial arbitrators. 
 
III.   THE PRIMACY OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT IN ARBITRATION LAW 
 
As many courts have stated, arbitration law rests on contract,118 and courts 
should enforce arbitration agreements remorselessly according to their terms.119   
This doctrine exists because the Supreme Court has used the Federal Arbitration Act 
to preempt state law with federal law that enforces arbitration agreements as written.  
Section 2 of the FAA provides: 
A written provision in any … contract … to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract … shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.120 
On its face, this provision seems unremarkable.  It treats an arbitration 
agreement like any other contract – enforceable unless doctrines such as 
unconscionability dictate otherwise.  In the hands of the Supreme Court, however, 
this provision has become law that requires literal and remorseless enforcement of 
arbitration agreements, even to the point of insulating arbitration agreements from 
meaningful judicial review.121  Accordingly, parties have the freedom to agree to 
almost anything in arbitration, even if the resulting bargain seems unfair.  
 
118 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
119 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
120 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016). 
121 See infra notes 159–166 and accompanying text.  




The reasons for this are somewhat complicated and reflect two themes: the 
presumptive desirability of enforcing mutually agreed upon contracts and the 
inherent fairness of arbitration as a substitute for litigation.  Mutual agreement 
offers the most obvious justification for enforcing arbitration agreements.  Because 
litigation is slow and costly, parties may rationally prefer to arbitrate their disputes 
because doing so can save considerable time and expense.122  Accordingly, if two 
parties have genuinely agreed that they would prefer arbitration instead of litigation, 
it seems perfectly fair to hold them to that bargain.123  
Things get a bit trickier when a party to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement 
claims that she did not genuinely agree to arbitrate her claim.  For example, 
individuals often sign or “click through” contracts of adhesion that provide for 
mandatory arbitration without reading or negotiating over the terms.124  This 
frequently happens when a person signs up for a credit card or cell phone service, or 
when an employer requires him to sign an employment agreement.125  In these 
situations, the absence of genuine consent means that the parties never reached a 
meeting of the minds about preferring arbitration, and the fairness of holding an 
unwilling party to her “bargain” becomes debatable.126  This suggests that courts 
should not routinely enforce pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements 
contained in contracts of adhesion. 
The Supreme Court solved this problem by treating arbitration as a 
fundamentally fair substitute for litigation.  According to the Court, arbitrators can 
competently find facts and follow the law.127  Although arbitration lacks some of 
litigation’s safeguards such as full discovery and appeal, parties to arbitration also 
 
122 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 (arbitration offers less costly and speedier alternative to litigation).  
123 See Stewart Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy 
Defense, 2 Cardozo L. Rev. 481, 489 (1981) (“To the extent that an arbitration clause or other forum 
selection clause is the product of arm's-length negotiation between informed parties, there is generally no 
reason not to enforce the agreement between the parties.  Where parties are free to resolve particular 
contract questions explicitly, there is little reason to forbid them to delegate the resolution of the same 
questions to an impartial third party.”); See also Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in 
Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1187 (1983) (voluntary assumption of obligation generally gives 
contract law its ethical force).  
124 See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text.   
125 Id. 
126 See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (“[W]hen a party of 
little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little 
or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his 
consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are 
not to be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider whether the terms of the contract 
are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.”); Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the 
Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement As an Adhesion Contract, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 319, 327–28 
(1999) (lack of true mutual assent weakens case for enforcing adhesion contracts). 
127 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231–32 (1987) (noting Supreme Court’s 
rejection of idea that judges cannot adequately resolve disputes and follow the law); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985) (“[A]daptability and expertise are hallmarks 
of arbitration.”); See also infra notes 151–156 and accompanying text. 




gain because arbitration is faster and less expensive than litigation.128  Accordingly, 
there is nothing fundamentally unfair about using contracts of adhesion to impose 
mandatory arbitration, even if one of the parties has not genuinely consented to the 
arbitration. 
To see the development of the law favoring mandatory arbitration, let us begin 
with Wilko v. Swan,129 a case in which the Supreme Court actually refused to 
enforce mandatory arbitration of a federal securities law claim brought by Wilko 
against his brokerage firm.  The contract that Wilko signed contained a mandatory 
arbitration clause, and the defendant moved under the Federal Arbitration Act to 
stay the litigation started by Wilko.130  Wilko countered, arguing that the arbitration 
clause was unenforceable because Section 14 of the Securities Act voided any 
contractual provision waiving compliance with the Securities Act.131  Wilko 
maintained, and the District Court agreed, that binding arbitration of Wilko’s claim 
amounted to such a waiver because litigation before courts was the only way to 
guarantee full vindication of Wilko’s rights under the Securities Act.132  The District 
Court therefore refused to stay Wilko’s lawsuit, but the Court of Appeals 
reversed.133  Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed 
with the District Court.134 
In so ruling, the Court considered the defendant’s argument that “arbitration is 
merely a form of trial to be used in lieu of a trial at law.”135  This claim had a point.  
Arbitrators had to follow federal law, just as judges would.136  No waiver of the 
securities laws existed, so arbitrators and judges would necessarily make effectively 
 
128 See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344 (Goal of the Federal Arbitration Act is to provide streamlined 
alternative to litigation); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280 (1995) 
(Arbitration offers a less expensive alternative to consumers challenging big business); Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp., 473 U.S. at 634 (1985) (parties choose arbitration over litigation to get the benefits of streamlined 
proceedings, expeditious results, and lower costs). 
129 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
130 Id. at 429;  The provision of the Federal Arbitration Act at stake provides: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States upon 
any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that the 
issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an 
agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of the action 
until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement, 
providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such 
arbitration. 9 U.S.C. §3 (2016).  
131 Wilko, 346 U.S at 430. 
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133 Id. at 429–30. 
134 Id. at 438.  
135 Id. at 433. 
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identical determinations when deciding cases.137  The Court rejected this argument, 
in part because the Court cared about the unequal positions of the two parties. 
The Court noted that the federal securities laws exist to protect buyers.138  
Sellers generally better understand the pros and cons of certain investments than 
buyers do, making it important that sellers treat buyers fairly.139  In the context of 
arbitration agreements, the inexperience of buyers prevents them from knowing how 
valuable litigation can be.140  This made enforcing the arbitration agreement against 
an ordinary person like Wilko unfair, and the Court refused to do so.141  
Wilko heavily influenced the law of arbitration for about twenty years by 
preventing contractual mandatory arbitration of federal statutory claims.  After that, 
however, judicial attitudes towards arbitration changed as judges stopped thinking 
of arbitration as avoidance of the legal system.  Instead, they began to see 
arbitration as simply another forum in which to resolve legal disputes and vindicate 
legal rights.  For example, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,142 the 
Court considered again the enforceability of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement 
between a brokerage firm and its customer.143  In October of 1984, the McMahons 
sued Shearson/American Express, alleging fraudulent behavior and excessive 
trading on their account under §10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, a RICO 
claim, and various state law claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty.144  
Shearson/American Express responded with a motion to compel arbitration under 
the mandatory arbitration clause of the McMahons’ brokerage contracts.145  
Although Wilko could easily have governed the outcome of this case, the Supreme 
Court chose instead to interpret Wilko narrowly and enforce the arbitration 
agreement.146 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion began by citing the Federal Arbitration 
Act, particularly its language that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
 
137 Wilko, 346 U.S at 433–34 (“We agree that in so far as the award in arbitration may be affected by legal 
requirements, statutes or common law, rather than by considerations of fairness, the provisions of the 
Securities Act control.”).   
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141 Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
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revocation of any contract.”147  This meant that federal law now had a clear policy 
favoring arbitration,148 requiring rigorous enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.149   
The Court then explained that Wilko was an unusual case that rested on the 
specific language of §14 of the Securities Act and the Court’s conclusion that 
arbitration could not properly vindicate the peculiar substantive rights at issue in 
that case.150  Justice O’Connor then pointed out how cases after Wilko had firmly 
established the general acceptability of arbitration as a substitute for litigation.151  
This acceptability looked past any potential unfairness arising from unequal 
bargaining power or the absence of genuine negotiation and agreement.152  Instead, 
Justice O’Connor focused on three reasons to have confidence in arbitration as a 
substitute for litigation.  First, arbitrators had the ability to resolve complex 
questions of fact.153  Second, the streamlined procedures of arbitration did not imply 
a meaningful restriction on substantive rights.154 Third, arbitrators would follow the 
law.155  This made it possible for the Court to conclude that there was no good 
statutory or policy reason to prevent enforcement of the arbitration agreement 
against the McMahons.156 
The trend embodied by McMahon continued in 1989, when the Supreme Court 
formally overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc.157 In the years that followed, the Court further strengthened the enforceability 
of arbitration agreements by using the Federal Arbitration Act to prevent 
consideration of state law claims that might otherwise invalidate arbitration 
agreements.  Two cases, AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion158 and Rent-A-Center, 
 
147 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (quoting 9 U.S.C. §2). 
148 But see Christopher Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 265, 300–320 (2015) 
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149 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (The Court cited with approval quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 
470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985): “The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private 
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agreements to arbitrate.”).   
150 Id. at 228. 
151 See id. at 232.  
152 Id. at 230. 
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156 Id. at 233–42; See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626–27 
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compatible with proper resolution of claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act); 14 Penn 
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use of arbitration to vindicate statutory rights). 
157 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
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West, Inc. v. Jackson,159 show the Court moving ever closer to giving drafters of 
arbitration agreements plenary power to define the scope of the parties’ rights, even 
if the provisions seem fundamentally unfair. 
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,160 the Court considered an arbitration 
agreement that required the plaintiff Jackson to arbitrate any dispute with his 
employer Rent-A-Center.161  Jackson wished to challenge the validity of this 
arbitration agreement in court, but the agreement contained a clause that gave the 
arbitrator sole power to decide whether the arbitration agreement was 
enforceable.162  This clause represented a very interesting maneuver by Rent-A-
Center.  In Rodriguez, the Court itself decided that Rodriguez’s arbitration contract 
was enforceable.163  Even though this review was very deferential, it reserved to 
judges the basic task of determining whether an arbitration contract was legally 
valid.  However, acceptance of the Rent-A-Center clause implied taking this power 
away from courts because anyone drafting an arbitration agreement could use a 
similar provision to defeat judicial review. 
One might ordinarily think that the Supreme Court would refuse to enforce 
clauses like this in order to preserve the judiciary’s power.  In this case, however, 
the Court ceded its power.  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion emphasized that 
arbitration is governed by contract, and that the Federal Arbitration Act requires 
courts to enforce them “according to their terms.”164  He went on to treat the 
delegation provision as an arbitration agreement that stood on its own, separate from 
the rest of the contract.165  Because Jackson did not come up with a timely argument 
about the unconscionability of the separate agreement, the Court had no choice but 
to uphold it.166 
Rent-A-Center did a great deal to establish the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements drafted by savvy parties, for it allowed clever drafters to prevent courts 
from deciding whether an arbitration would go forward under the terms found in the 
arbitration agreement.  However, the decision did not guarantee the validity of all 
arbitration agreements.  Two possible holes remained.  First, it was at least 
theoretically possible that an arbitrator would declare an arbitration agreement 
 
159 Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010).  
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unenforceable.167  Second, courts could still review and potentially invalidate 
arbitration agreements that did not contain delegation clauses. 
 
The Court made these possibilities rather unlikely in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. 
Concepcion.168  In that case, the Concepcions sued AT&T in the Southern District 
of California for improperly charging them for sales taxes.169  Their complaint 
became consolidated with a potential class action contending that AT&T had 
engaged in fraud by advertising cell phones as free while charging sales tax.170  
AT&T responded by moving to compel arbitration under the relevant clause of the 
Concepcions’ service contract.171  Among other things, this clause prohibited class-
wide arbitrations, thereby preventing consumers like the Concepcions from banding 
together to prosecute their claims.172 
The class-relief prohibition gave Concepcion a most interesting twist, for the 
California Supreme Court had previously adopted the so-called Discover Bank rule, 
which declared arbitration agreements containing waivers of class actions 
unconscionable and invalid.173  Because the Federal Arbitration Act did not require 
enforcement of arbitration agreements when law or equity called for revocation, the 
Concepcions could argue that their arbitration agreement was invalid as a matter of 
California law, and that the Federal Arbitration Act could not be used to force 
arbitration.174  Both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit agreed.175  The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari and reversed, stating that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempted state law that interfered with the federal policy favoring enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.176  According to the Court, the Discover Bank rule was just 
this type of state law, and it had to yield to the Federal Arbitration Act’s preference 
for enforcing arbitration agreements.177 
Concepcion supported Rent-A-Center by instructing judges and arbitrators alike 
to ignore state law that is hostile to enforcing an arbitration agreement, even if the 
 
167 In theory, the arbitrator could declare the arbitration agreement unenforceable and send the dispute to 
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agreement in question is fundamentally unfair.  Indeed, AT&T had used a contract 
of adhesion to not only maneuver the Concepcions into arbitration, but also to 
discourage them from bringing a claim at all.  AT&T’s alleged offense of charging 
sales tax inflicted relatively little injury upon the Concepcions, so the costs of 
arbitration would surely have overwhelmed any recovery they could hope for in an 
individual action. Class action would restore the possibility of meaningful recovery 
by sharing expenses across a number of similarly situated plaintiffs, and it would 
provide meaningful incentives for injured parties to hold AT&T accountable for any 
wrongs it committed.  However, if class action was not possible, injured parties like 
the Concepcions would probably never pursue their claims, allowing AT&T to 
avoid accountability for any wrongdoing it may have committed. 
Given these consequences, the California Supreme Court’s Discover Bank rule 
seemed eminently sensible.  It was fundamentally unfair for an arbitration 
agreement to strip a consumer of procedural options that made recovery possible, 
and the Supreme Court could easily have used Discover Bank to refuse enforcement 
of the arbitration agreement under the Federal Arbitration Act.  However, by 
interpreting the Act to preempt California contract law, the Court showed that it did 
not want judges or arbitrators to consider state law doctrines that might prevent the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.  Instead, it preferred to enforce arbitration 
agreements as written178 because doing so gave the parties full discretion to define 
arbitration procedures tailored to their potential disputes.179 
The line of cases that includes McMahon, Rodriguez, Rent-A-Center and 
Concepcion send a clear signal that, as far as the Supreme Court is concerned, 
courts must enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements according to their terms.180  
Tellingly, none of these cases involved agreements negotiated by parties at arms’ 
length.  Instead, all appear to involve adhesion contracts.181  Accordingly, there is a 
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clear argument that the law allows businesses to use contracts of adhesion to bind 
consumers to arbitration under whatever conditions the business prefers.   
 
IV.   EVIDENTLY PARTIAL ARBITRATORS, FAIRNESS IN ARBITRATION, AND WAIVER 
 
Although the cases discussed above do not rule directly on the enforceability of 
agreements to appoint evidently partial arbitrators, the primacy of freedom of 
contract in arbitration strongly suggests that courts would enforce such agreements.  
As the NFLMC court recognized, if well-established doctrine enforces arbitration 
agreements (including ones procured through adhesion contracts) as written, why 
wouldn’t an evidently partial arbitrator be among the things two parties could agree 
on?182  The answer to this question requires a closer look at law directed towards 
biased arbitrators and the vital role that neutral arbitrators play in justifying freedom 
of contract in arbitration law.   
The starting point for this examination is §10 of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
which empowers courts to vacate arbitration awards when the arbitrator is 
“evidently partial.”183  This language alone shows that Congress considered neutral 
arbitrators critical to the fairness of arbitration.  Accordingly, there is a good 
argument that the federal policy favoring arbitration assumes that arbitration takes 
place before a neutral arbitrator. 
The Supreme Court interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act this way in 
Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co.184  In that case, 
Commonwealth pursued a claim against Continental for payments allegedly owed 
by Continental as the surety for a prime contractor with whom Commonwealth had 
done business.185  Commonwealth’s contract with the prime contractor required 
arbitration of the claim before three arbitrators.186  Each party selected one 
arbitrator, and the two selected arbitrators chose a third neutral arbitrator.187  
Unfortunately, the third arbitrator did not disclose to the parties that he had close 
business dealings with the prime contractor over a period of several years, and the 
arbitration went forward with Continental unaware of this potential bias.188  
Continental learned of these connections after the award was rendered, and it 
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immediately moved to vacate the award.189  The Supreme Court supported 
Continental, ruling that arbitrators had a duty to disclose dealings with the parties 
that might create an impression of bias.190   
 
In so ruling, the Court’s plurality opinion drew specific attention to section 10 
of the Federal Arbitration Act as the embodiment of Congress’ desire for impartial 
arbitration.191  The Court went on to state that courts should be “even more 
scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges” because 
arbitrators “have completely free rein to decide the law as well as the facts and are 
not subject to appellate review.”192  Making arbitrators disclose possible conflicts of 
interest would not hamper the effectiveness of arbitration, and making such 
information available would help insure the integrity of the arbitration process.193 
Commonwealth Coatings has spawned two somewhat contradictory lines of 
cases that influence the extent to which parties may agree to the appointment of 
evidently partial arbitrators.  One line invalidates agreements imposed on employees 
to procure ostensible consent about the appointment of evidently partial arbitrators. 
These results emphasize the importance of impartiality to the fairness of using 
arbitration as a substitute for litigation.  The second line recognizes waiver by those 
who know about possible bias but do not object to the appointment of an evidently 
partial arbitrator.  These results include an Eighth Circuit holding that the NFLPA 
had waived claims concerning an evidently partial arbitrator in a case involving an 
agreement similar to the one in NFLMC, and they reflect the notion that consent, 
whether actual or ostensible, can justify arbitration procedures that would otherwise 
be objectionable.   
 
A. The Central Importance of Impartial Arbitrators 
 
Commonwealth Coatings’ strong endorsement of arbitral neutrality suggests 
that freedom of contract in arbitration has its limits, especially when it comes to the 
appointment of evidently biased arbitrators.  Freedom of contract heavily influences 
arbitration law on the theory that when two parties agree to a specific arbitration 
process, the two parties have determined that the arbitration serves their interests 
more effectively than litigation would.194  It is therefore fair to enforce whatever 
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arbitration the parties agreed to, including the appointment of evidently partial 
arbitrators, because agreement implies that the arbitration does not unduly harm 
either party.195  If arbitration really were horribly detrimental to one of the parties, 
that party would presumably not have agreed to arbitration.196 
The importance of impartial arbitrators comes to the fore when we contemplate 
arbitrations procured in contracts of adhesion.  Parties making those contracts often 
do so without reviewing or negotiating about the terms involved.197  Accordingly, 
those parties do not agree in the sense that parties to other contracts do.198  Contracts 
of adhesion therefore represent a fictionalized form of agreement.  This undermines 
the argument in favor of freedom of contract in arbitration because the absence of 
genuine, formal agreement vitiates the claim that each party prefers arbitration to 
litigation.199   
If the simple existence of genuine agreement cannot fully support robust 
freedom of contract in arbitration, more justification for the routine enforcement of 
arbitration agreements as written becomes necessary.  As noted earlier, the Supreme 
Court solved this problem characterizing arbitration as a reasonably fair substitute 
for litigation.200  Doing so allowed the Court to look past the fact that the party 
trying to avoid mandatory arbitration might not have genuinely agreed to 
arbitration.  It was still fundamentally fair to force that party to honor its arbitration 
agreement, even if procured in a contract of adhesion, because the arbitration was a 
fair substitute for litigation.  To put it slightly differently, mandatory arbitration 
agreements remained enforceable because parties to arbitration did not give up 
anything of fundamental importance in arbitration.  Arbitration simply represented 
the resolution of the parties’ disputes in a different forum, not the substantive loss of 
rights.201 
Arbitration as fair substitute for litigation makes impartial arbitrators hugely 
important.  Many procedural and substantive choices can be made about litigation 
without compromising its fundamental fairness.  For example, different burdens of 
proof,202 specialized rules of evidence,203 and varying local rules204 all occur without 
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making litigation fundamentally unfair.  By contrast, our legal system finds biased 
judges completely unacceptable because judicial bias totally compromises 
fundamental fairness.205 
If impartial judges form a sine qua non of fair litigation, it follows that 
arbitration must involve impartial arbitrators to be a fair substitute for litigation.  In 
the context of adhesion contracts, a party that ostensibly agrees to evidently partial 
arbitrators will probably be surprised to learn that he has agreed to a one-sided 
dispute resolution process.  It might enter his mind that resolution of any disputes 
would be arbitrated, but the idea that biased decision makers would control the 
process would be a shock.  It therefore would be fundamentally unfair to force this 
person to arbitrate before evidently partial arbitrators on the pretext of enforcing a 
fictional agreement. 
Case law reflects this thinking.  For example, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson 
Lane Corp.,206 the Supreme Court considered an argument that enforcing an 
arbitration agreement would be unfair, in part because of the risk that arbitrators 
might be biased.207  The Court accepted that such bias would be problematic, but 
enforced the arbitration agreement because the rules of the arbitration contained 
protection against biased arbitrators.208 
Similarly, courts have refused to compel arbitration in cases where the agreed 
upon process of selection raised an unacceptable risk of biased arbitrators.  For 
example, in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,209 the Fourth Circuit refused to 
compel arbitration of a sexual harassment claim brought by Phillips against her 
employer, the Hooters restaurant chain.210  Phillips had worked as a bartender for 
Hooters and claimed that a Hooters official had sexually harassed her by touching 
her inappropriately.211  She asked her manager for help and was encouraged to “let it 
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go.”212  Instead, Phillips resigned and claimed a violation of her rights under Title 
VII.213  Hooters responded by invoking a mandatory arbitration agreement signed by 
Phillips during her employment.214  Phillips refused, and Hooters sued to compel 
arbitration.215   
The Fourth Circuit recognized the benefits of arbitration and the general policy 
favoring arbitration,216 but it refused to enforce the arbitration agreement because 
the agreement allowed Hooters to draft the rules of arbitration as it saw fit.217  
Hooters had indeed exercised this right to draft very one-sided rules that, among 
other things, gave Hooters control over appointment of the arbitrators, even to the 
point of appointing its own managers.218  The court considered such behavior 
inconsistent with the implied neutrality inherent in any arbitration agreement.219  
This made the Hooters rules “so one-sided that their only possible purpose is to 
undermine the neutrality of the proceeding.”220  This led to the conclusion that 
Hooters had breached the arbitration agreement, and the court released Phillips from 
any obligation to arbitrate.221 
The Sixth Circuit employed similar reasoning in McMullen v. Meijer, Inc.222  
This case involved an appeal about termination by McMullen, a store detective, 
against her former employer Meijer.223  Among other things, that appeal was subject 
to an arbitration agreement giving Meijer the ability to compile unilaterally a list of 
five arbitrators from whom the McMullen and Meijer would choose.224  In refusing 
to enforce the selection rule, the court recognized the general enforceability of 
arbitration agreements,225 but worried that Meijer’s control would lead to bias, in 
part because Meijer could use the promise of repeat business to incentivize 
arbitrator behavior favoring Meijer.226  The resulting lack of neutrality prevented the 
ensuing arbitration from being an appropriate substitute for litigation.227 
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Cases like Phillips and McMullen show that courts consider the appointment of 
biased arbitrators deeply problematic even though freedom of contract normally 
makes arbitration agreements enforceable as written.  By refusing to enforce 
arbitration agreements designed to select biased arbitrators, these cases suggest that 
parties to arbitration can never agree to such appointments, freedom of contract 
notwithstanding.  However, before we so conclude, we should also consider cases 
that permit parties to waive complaints about evidently partial arbitrators. 
 
B.  Waiving Claims of Evident Partiality Against Arbitrators 
  
Commonwealth Coatings speaks powerfully to the importance of neutral 
arbitrators, but its holding also implies that a party can waive its right to having one.  
By requiring an arbitrator to disclose facts betraying possible bias, the Court gave 
potentially prejudiced parties the opportunity to ask for the arbitrator’s removal.  If 
the request gets made, but the arbitrator continues to serve, the possibility of a legal 
action to vacate the arbitrator’s award on grounds of evident partiality remains.  
However, if the request is not made, the potentially injured party cannot maintain 
such an action because he has waived his right to object.  Indeed, two cases 
(including one that involved the NFL and its union) effectively hold that a party, 
particularly the NFLPA, can agree to the appointment of a biased arbitrator. 
In Garfield v. Wiest,228 the Second Circuit considered a claim about arbitration 
under the membership agreement of the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).229  
The case arose from a dispute between NYSE member Garfield & Co. and Wiest, a 
former Garfield partner who had resigned and joined another NYSE member 
firm.230  Under the terms of the NYSE membership agreement, the dispute was 
subject to arbitration before a panel composed of arbitrators from NYSE member 
firms.231  Garfield lost the arbitration and sued to vacate the award on the ground 
that the arbitrators did not disclose their “almost certain” dealings with Wiest’s new 
firm.232   
Judge Waterman’s opinion rejected this argument by applying Commonwealth 
Coatings.  He wrote: 
[C]ommonwealth Coatings teaches that when parties agree to arbitration, the 
arbitrators, in order to avoid even the appearance of bias, must disclose any 
nontrivial dealings with one party which are not known to the other party.  A 
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necessary corollary is that, once disclosure has been made, the arbitrator may be 
challenged for cause if the dealings are nontrivial.  The obverse of this last 
proposition is that when such challenges are waived in advance by the parties as to 
certain transactions, arbitrators are not required to disclose participation in such 
transactions.233 
The court then concluded that Garfield had waived in advance any objections 
concerning bias arising from the arbitrators’ routine business transactions as NYSE 
member.234  When Garfield joined the NYSE, it agreed to mandatory arbitration of 
disputes like the one at hand.235  The arbitration rules specified that the arbitrators 
would be from NYSE member firms, so Garfield “most certainly knew” and 
accepted that the arbitrators had business dealings with Wiest’s new firm.236  
Despite this knowledge, Garfield never formally moved for the arbitrators to recuse 
themselves for bias.237  Accordingly, it could not now complain of being misled by 
arbitrators trying to hide their biases.238 
Similarly, in Williams v. National Football League,239 the Eighth Circuit 
applied almost identical reasoning to apply waiver to player claims of bias in 
arbitrations held under an earlier version of the NFL’s Collective Bargaining 
Agreement.240  In that case, Williams and other players challenged suspensions 
handed down for alleged violation of the NFL’s Policy on Anabolic Steroids and 
Related Substances (“Policy”).241  The players had tested positive for a banned 
substance and received four-game suspensions pursuant to the Policy.242  They 
appealed, and the league appointed Jeffrey Pash, the league’s Vice President and 
General Counsel, as arbitrator.243  Pash ruled against the players, who filed suit 
seeking, among other things, vacation of the award on grounds of Pash’s bias.244  
This argument failed at both the district court and court of appeals because the 
Policy specified that “either the Commissioner or his designee” would serve as 
arbitrator.245  
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The Eighth Circuit understood that evident partiality allowed the court to vacate 
the award against the players.246  However, waiver applied because the players had 
agreed to arbitration before the Commissioner or his designee via the CBA, which 
incorporated the Policy.247  Echoing Wiest, the court believed that the agreement 
made it impossible for the players to claim any surprise about facts suggesting 
Pash’s bias.248  This made vacating the awards inappropriate.249 
Cases that allow waiver of claims against biased arbitrators, and especially 
Williams, significantly complicate the legacy of Commonwealth Coatings.  If only 
cases like Phillips and McMullen existed, it would be relatively straightforward to 
conclude that courts refuse to extend freedom of contract to the appointment of 
biased arbitrators because doing so destroys arbitration as a fair substitute for 
litigation.  However, cases like Wiest and Williams show that courts are also willing 
to enforce choices made by parties who understand the risks of biased arbitrators 
and accept them.  When combined with the primacy of freedom of contract in 
arbitration, the possibility of waiver makes it difficult to conclude that the law never 
permits agreements to appoint a biased arbitrator.  As I will now discuss, resolving 
this tension properly requires sensitivity to a line the Supreme Court has been 
reluctant to recognize in arbitration law. 
 
V.  SORTING OUT NFLMC: ENDING ROUTINE CONFLATION IN THE LAW OF 
ARBITRATION 
A.   The Proper Understanding of NFLMC 
 
NFLMC has puzzling and potentially troubling implications because the 
Supreme Court has made arbitration law insensitive to differences among pre-
dispute arbitration agreements.  In particular, the Court has consistently applied 
freedom of contract to enforce arbitration clauses without truly considering whether 
parties have genuinely agreed to or understood the arrangements being enforced.  
This has left the entirely justified impression that, as far as the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements is concerned, courts must enforce all contracts according to 
their terms.250 
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If NFLMC truly represents the latest in a string of cases enforcing arbitration 
agreements as written, fissures in the law emerge.  If courts must enforce all 
arbitration agreements according to their terms, then of course Brady must accept a 
biased arbitrator, and so must employees like McMullen and Phillips.  To put it 
somewhat differently, NFLMC could imply that McMullen and Phillips were 
wrongly decided, and that businesses can use contracts of adhesion to maneuver 
consumers and employees into one-sided arbitrations.251  Such a result would, in my 
opinion, be rather troubling because it would exacerbate what many already 
consider the overuse of arbitration agreements to limit the rights of consumers and 
ordinary employees.252 
Fortunately, a nuanced reading of the case law avoids this problem.  As noted 
earlier, the Supreme Court’s freedom of contract in arbitration cases make two 
separate arguments that work together to make enforcing pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements in adhesion contracts fair.  First, when two parties agree to arbitrate a 
dispute, their consent makes arbitration presumptively fair.253  Second, arbitration 
itself is a fair substitute for litigation.254  Accordingly, it is fair to enforce arbitration 
agreements against a party whose only consent is the fictitious variety found in 
contracts of adhesion.    
The relationship between these arguments implies a distinction between 
arbitration agreements where one party does not know or understand what it is 
getting into from agreements where the parties do.  For arbitration agreements 
where a party does not know or understand what is going on, the appointment of 
biased arbitrators makes fundamental fairness impossible.  The lack of 
understanding removes consent as a reason for enforcement, and biased arbitration 
cannot provide a fair substitute for litigation.  Things are different, of course, if both 
parties understand what is going on in an arbitration agreement.  In such a case, 
fairness derived from genuine agreement compensates for the unfairness inherent in 
arbitration before a biased arbitrator.  Indeed, this explains why lower courts have 
refused to enforce arbitration agreements that appoint evidently partial arbitrators in 
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cases like Phillips and McMullen while allowing waiver of claims about biased 
arbitrators in cases like Wiest and Williams.   
Both Phillips and McMullen were ordinary employees who probably did not 
understand what they were agreeing to and were highly unlikely to have knowingly 
consented to arbitration before an evidently partial arbitrator.  Courts 
understandably considered this fundamentally unfair and refused to enforce the 
arbitration agreements.  By contrast, in Wiest and Williams the disappointed parties 
were sophisticated actors who knew and understood what they were getting into.  
As a member of the NYSE, Garfield operated at an entirely different level of legal 
sophistication than did McMullen or Phillips.  As the court noted, Garfield surely 
knew that the individuals who would serve as arbitrators regularly did business with 
NYSE member firms.  Similarly, in Williams the NFLPA regularly negotiated with 
the NFL and knew exactly what it was doing when it ceded control of the arbitrator 
to the league.  Having agreed to the appointment of potentially biased arbitrators, 
neither Garfield nor Williams could complain that they had been treated unfairly.  
To put it slightly differently, courts saw nothing fundamentally unfair about holding 
Garfield or Williams to an arbitration bargain that they or their representatives 
understood.  Their knowing consent provided fairness in a way that the illusory 
consent of Phillips and McMullen could not. 
The foregoing explains how courts should understand and apply NFLMC.  In a 
nutshell, the Second Circuit decided NFLMC correctly, but its result should apply 
only in cases where a reasonably sophisticated party knows that it has agreed to an 
evidently partial arbitrator and understands the consequences.  NFLMC clearly 
involved parties who understood that they had agreed to an evidently partial 
arbitrator and the possible consequences.  The parties agreed to its terms after 
months of detailed negotiations, and the parties were both sophisticated, with ample 
access to counsel if the legal implications of the agreement proved unclear.  
Although it is not possible to know exactly why the NFLPA accepted Goodell as a 
potential arbitrator, the union knew exactly who Goodell was and understood that 
his position made him likely to favor the league in any dispute.  Indeed, given the 
result in Williams, the NFLPA had actually experienced enforcement of arbitration 
awards given by arbitrators employed by the NFL.  It was therefore entirely fair to 
hold Brady and the union to the bargain they had made.  By contrast, however, it 
would not be fair to extend NFLMC to cases where a party does not have 
comparable knowledge and understanding.  NFLMC should not control cases 
involving consumers and ordinary employees who agree to biased arbitration 
because those people, like McMullen and Phillips, do not know enough to give the 
kind of consent needed to justify enforcing what would otherwise be an unfair, 
biased arbitration.  




B. Doctrinal Implementation of NFLMC 
 
The proper understanding of NFLMC raises an interesting question of how to 
implement that understanding in doctrine.  In theory, one could adopt a rule 
designed to implement the principles behind NFLMC perfectly.  Such a rule would 
enforce agreements to appoint biased arbitrators only when both parties genuinely 
know and understand what they are agreeing to.  As a matter of practice, however, 
this rule would become unworkable because ambiguities about what parties 
genuinely know and understand invites litigation that would undo the benefits of 
arbitration.  For example, a sophisticated party might agree to the appointment of a 
particular arbitrator and then refuse to arbitrate on the supposed ground that she did 
not truly know or understand what she had agreed to.  Determining the truth of this 
assertion would require litigation that would be difficult to conclude at summary 
judgment.  The possibility of expense and delay would invite parties to play games 
that defeat the prompt and cost-effective dispute resolution associated with 
arbitration. 
The foregoing shows that effective implementation of NFLMC requires easily 
applied rules that adequately protect unknowing parties from unfair arbitration 
while permitting sophisticated parties to arrange arbitration as they see fit.  I 
propose doing this by identifying the situations that are likely to feature unknowing 
fictitious agreement and parties relatively susceptible to exploitation by unfair 
arbitration.  This leads to a rule that refuses to enforce pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements that contemplate evidently partial arbitrators when 1) the agreement is 
part of an adhesion contract; and 2) the contract is deployed against ordinary 
individuals acting as consumers or non-unionized employees. 
As an initial matter, this proposed rule is easy to apply.  Judges are quite 
familiar with contracts of adhesion, and it is readily apparent whether a party to 
arbitration has agreed to one.  It is equally easy to identify if a party is an ordinary 
individual acting as a consumer or non-unionized employee. 
Additionally, because contracts of adhesion are frequently used to maneuver the 
unwitting into arbitration with undesirable terms, focusing the prohibition on 
adhesion contracts captures situations in which unwitting agreement is most likely 
to occur.  By contrast, if parties genuinely bargain over the terms of an arbitration 
agreement, they probably know and understand what they have agreed to.  Thus, 
although it is possible that a non-adhesion contract could contain an unfair 
agreement about biased arbitrators, the chances are sufficiently low that it is not 
worth litigating these possibilities.   
Finally, applying the prohibition only to agreements involving a consumer or 
non-unionized employee focuses even more tightly on situations likely to involve 




unfairness while leaving appropriate room for freedom of contract.  Although 
adhesion contracts raise significant risk of unfairness, sophisticated parties 
sometimes use them appropriately.  For example, in Wiest, the parties to the 
arbitration agreement were an NYSE member firm and one of its partners.  They 
agreed to a contract promulgated by the NYSE, and it made sense for the contract to 
be signed on a take-it-or-leave-it basis because the NYSE likely needed all of its 
members to agree to the same terms and conditions.  Granted, it was possible that 
the arbitrators selected under that agreement would prove biased.  However, given 
the need for uniformity and the sophistication of the parties, forcing Garfield to live 
up to the agreement seemed reasonably fair.  Cases like Wiest show why applying 
the prohibition to all adhesion contracts does not make sense.  Corporate entities 
and individuals acting outside their consumer capacity are relatively likely to know 
what they are doing, so it seems fair to preserve their ability to contract freely about 
the terms of arbitration. 
Similarly, it makes sense to exclude unionized employees form protection 
because the collective bargaining process adds both protection and expertise.  A 
union that agrees to arbitration of employee claims surely understands what it is 
doing.  If impartiality matters to the union, it will review the agreement to ensure 
the appointment of unbiased arbitrators.  If the employer offers other concessions 
such as higher pay in exchange for a biased arbitration process, that bargain should 
be honored as fair.  Indeed, this is precisely what happened in Williams and 
NFLMC. 
Because it is an approximation for the exact policy implied by NFLMC, the rule 
proposed here can be criticized for failing to prohibit some cases of unfair 
arbitration. Some business actors will be as ignorant as consumers about arbitration, 
and they will sign arbitration agreements that will probably be enforced.  Similarly, 
there will be cases in which a consumer or non-unionized employee agrees to 
appointment of a biased arbitrator, but without signing a contract of adhesion.  The 
rule proposed here would probably mishandle these situations by enforcing the 
arbitration agreements in question.  Nevertheless, I would be reluctant to expand the 
reach of the prohibition against biased arbitrators because other possible rules would 
probably unduly interfere with freedom of contracts.  For example, a rule focused 
solely on adhesion contracts would prohibit agreements reached by sophisticated 
parties like Garfield and Wiest.  Similarly, a rule focused solely on consumers 
would wind up prohibiting agreements in which the likelihood of genuine 
agreement is relatively high.  It therefore makes sense to stick with the rule 
proposed here, even though it is imperfect. 
 




VI.   CONCLUSION 
 
The Supreme Court’s arbitration law jurisprudence emphasizes freedom of 
contract, and the Second Circuit’s decision in NFLMC makes sense because the 
NFL and NFLPA genuinely agreed to the appointment of Commissioner Goodell as 
arbitrator.  Ironically, however, studying NFLMC reveals that there is good reason 
for limiting freedom of contract in arbitration law, especially when it comes to the 
appointment of evidently partial arbitrators.  This leads to the realization that courts 
should refuse to enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements when they involve 
adhesion contracts and ordinary consumers or non-union employees because these 
cases involve a relatively high risk of unfairness.  Hopefully future courts will adopt 
this understanding of NFLMC and use it to improve federal arbitration law. 
 
